

# Propagation of Trust and Distrust

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## ABSTRACT

A (directed) network of people connected by ratings or trust scores, and a model for propagating those trust scores, is a fundamental building block in many of today's most successful e-commerce and recommendation systems. We develop a framework of trust propagation schemes, each of which may be appropriate in certain circumstances, and evaluate the schemes on a large trust network consisting of 800K trust scores expressed among 130K people. We show that a small number of expressed trusts/distrust per individual allows us to predict trust between any two people in the system with high accuracy. Our work appears to be the first to incorporate distrust in a computational trust propagation setting.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

H.3.3 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Information Search and Retrieval; H.3.5 [Information Storage and Retrieval]: Online Information Services—*Web based services*; G.1 [Numerical Analysis]: Numerical Linear Algebra; G.2 [Discrete Mathematics]: Graph Theory—*Graph algorithms*

## General Terms

Algorithms, Experimentation, Measurement

## Keywords

Trust propagation, web of trust, distrust

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The web increasingly impacts the processes used by individuals to express as well as discern preferences among items. A user may turn to the web for information on purchases such as digital cameras, songs, or movie tickets; or for information on much higher impact acquisitions such as houses, jobs, or even mates. As these decisions and the underlying financial processes themselves migrate

to the web, there is growing economic motivation to spread information—and sometimes disinformation—through the web. Open standards and a low barrier to publication demand novel mechanisms for validating information. Thus, we see unscrupulous exploitations of the holes in the social fabric of the web: successful manipulation of stocks by teenagers posting on investment boards under assumed personas; posts by product marketers pretending to be customers extolling the virtues of their product; online relationships that turn sour when one partner uncovers dramatic misinformation with respect to age or gender; link spamming of search engines to simulate popularity; and so forth.

One commonly proposed solution to this problem is to build and maintain a *web of trust* either in microcosm (as for an individual web site) or in macrocosm (across the whole web) that would allow users to express trust of other users, and in return would apply the entire web of relationships and trusts to help a user assess the likely quality of information before acting on it. Through such a web of trust, a user can develop an opinion of another user without prior interaction. The goal of this paper is to propose and analyze algorithms for implementing such a web of trust.

Such a network is a fundamental building block in many of today's most successful e-commerce and recommendation systems. On eBay ([ebay.com](http://ebay.com)), for instance, a model of trust has significant influence on the price an item may command. While on Epinions ([epinions.com](http://epinions.com)), conclusions drawn from the web of trust are linked to many behaviors of the system, including decisions on items to which each user is exposed.

### 1.1 Approaches to trust propagation

A natural approach to estimate the quality of a piece of information is to aggregate the opinions of many users. But this approach suffers from the same concerns around disinformation as the web at large: it is easy for a user or coalition of users to adopt many personas and together express a large number of biased opinions. Instead, we wish to ground our conclusions in trust relationships that have been built and maintained over time, much as individuals do in the real world. A user is much more likely to believe statements from a trusted acquaintance than from a stranger.

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And recursively, since a trusted acquaintance will also trust the beliefs of her friends, trusts may propagate (with appropriate discounting) through the relationship network.

An approach centered on relationships of trust provides two primary benefits. First, a user wishing to assess a large number of reviews, judgments, or other pieces of information on the web will benefit from the ability of a web of trust to present a view of the data tailored to the individual user, and mediated through the sources trusted by the user. And second, users who are globally well-trusted may command greater influence and higher prices for goods and services. Such a system encourages individuals to act in a trustworthy manner [4], placing positive pressure on the evolving social constructs of the web. Indeed, social network theory and economics have considered a variety of facets of this general subject [1, 2, 3, 6, 25].

## 1.2 Introducing distrust

Recent works [14, 21] give a mathematical approach to the propagation of trust, but do not extend to the case in which users may also express distrust. However, experience with real-world implemented trust systems such as Epinions and eBay suggests that distrust is at least as important as trust. In the absence of treatment of distrust in prior work, it is unclear how to model and propagate distrust. For instance: does a trust score of 0 translate to distrust or to ‘no opinion’? Merely shifting all trust scores so that no negative values remain (and then using a trust propagation method such as [14]) will not address this fundamental issue; such a “shift” would be sensitive to outliers and additionally distort the semantics of a zero score.

Modeling distrust as negative trust raises a number of challenges—both algorithmic and philosophical. For instance, the principal eigenvector of the matrix of trust values need no longer be real. This is a barrier to approaches in which the trust matrix is turned into a Markov chain (what do negative probabilities mean?) and the principal eigenvector is interpreted as an absolute measure of trust for each node. In fact, our goal is not an absolute measure of trust for each node—rather, we wish to determine a measure of trust from any node to any other. Another challenge: what does it mean to combine distrusts through successive people in a chain? One of the main contributions of our paper is to address this situation. We try to develop an understanding of appropriate models for the propagation of distrust (Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.3). One of our findings is that even a small amount of information about distrust (rather than information about trust alone) can provide tangibly better judgments about how much user  $i$  should trust user  $j$ .

## 1.3 Summary of results

Typical *webs of trust* tend to be relatively “sparse”: virtually every user has expressed trust values for only a handful other users. A fundamental problem is using such webs is that of determining trust values for the majority of user pairs for whom we have not explicitly received a trust rating.

Mechanisms for addressing this problem have been studied in economics, computer science and marketing, albeit typically without a computational component. We present a broad taxonomy of schemes for propagation of trust through a network of relationships, and evaluate 81 combinations of trust and distrust propagation against a large collections of expressed trusts provided by Epinions. To our knowledge,

this is the first empirical study on a large, real, deployed web of trust.

We rank different propagation mechanisms mostly from the perspective of predictive accuracy, in the following sense: our experiments involve masking a portion of the known trust ratings and predicting these from the remainder — a leave-one-out cross-validation. The hope is that a better understanding of what is correct will lead to better approximations to accuracy.

The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 covers related work. Section 3 then describes our algorithms, and the taxonomy of mechanisms that ties them together. Section 4 covers the web of trust we analyze. In Section 5 we provide experimental results comparing the algorithms and draw conclusions about the effectiveness of trust propagation on real-world data.

## 2. RELATED WORK

A number of disciplines have looked at various issues related to trust, including the incremental value assigned by people to transacting with a trusted party and how trust affects people’s beliefs and decision making.

Kahneman et al. [13] were among the first to study these phenomena in the context of decision making. There is also a substantial body of work on understanding trust in the field of political science [9, 18, 23]. One could draw a number of useful lessons from these fields, especially in assigning semantics to trust statements; unfortunately, that work is not computational in nature.

There has been considerable work on trust in computer science, most of it focused in the area of security. Formal logical models [8, 10] have been used to in the context of cryptography and authentication. PGP [24] was one of first popular systems to explicitly use the term “Web of Trust”, though it was not in the context of search or information flow. We believe that the *same kind* of trust relations between agents can be used for a much wider range of applications than just for belief in statements about identity. Gladwell’s popular book “The Tipping Point” [11] studies the way information flows are mediated by the networks of people and their associated trust relations.

There has been substantial work in the business management community on the value of trust. Akerlof’s classic [1] showed the importance of information regarding the quality of a product (or service). Akerlof showed how information, i.e., knowledge about the trustworthiness of a seller, is vital for the functioning of a market. Trust is an important aspect of on-line communities. Armstrong and Hagel [2] posit the importance of trust and community for on-line commerce.

Recently, due to the emergence of e-commerce, there has been work in the area of developing computational models of trust. Ba, Whinston, and Zhang [5] provide a game theoretic approach of trust and conclude that in the presence of an authenticating third party, the most utilitarian course of action for a (market) user is to behave honestly. There have been a number of proposed models and empirical studies of the eBay trust model [12, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22]. However, that line of work has not considered models of propagating trust.

In the last few years, a number of researchers have started looking at the problem of propagating trust through networks. Yu and Singh [25] propose a framework which, in contrast to our work, assumes symmetry and arbitrary transitivity. Kamvar, Schlosser, and Garcia-Molina [14] consider

trust propagation in a peer-to-peer environment and provide an approach that is close to one of our techniques, without the incorporation of distrust. Further, their goal is to assign to each node an universal measure of trust (analogous to the Pagerank measure for web pages), rather on a pairwise basis as we seek to. In general, most of the work on trust propagation has been inhibited by the lack of empirical data. Very recently, Richardson, Agrawal, and Domingos [21] develop a “path-algebra” model of trust propagation which is the closest to ours; moreover, like us, they use data from Epinions to validate their algorithms. To our knowledge, these are the only attempts at a comparative analysis of different propagation algorithms based on a real, large, data set. Moreover, none of the above algorithms attempts to model distrust in any manner.

### 3. ALGORITHMS

In this section we describe a framework for trust prediction and develop algorithms in this framework. In Section 5 we compare a number of these algorithms, including most popular propagation schemes.

We assume a universe of  $n$  users, each of which may optionally express some level of trust and distrust for any other user. These values can be viewed as a real-valued matrix; however, to keep our development clean, we will in fact partition its entries into two matrices, one for trust and the other for distrust. We take  $T$  to be the *matrix of trusts*;  $t_{ij}$  is the trust that user  $i$  holds for user  $j$ . The values  $t_{ij}$  are assumed to lie between 0 and 1. Similarly, we take  $D$  to be the *matrix of distrusts*, in which  $d_{ij}$  again lies between 0 and 1. This formulation is slightly redundant: it allows a user to express both trust and distrust with respect to another user.<sup>1</sup> The main goal of our work is to predict an unknown trust/distrust value between any two users, using the entries available in the trust and distrust matrices.

We will use matrix  $B$  to represent a set of beliefs that we hold about the world. In different contexts,  $B_{ij}$  might be  $i$ 's trust of  $j$ , or a combination of  $i$ 's trust and distrust of  $j$ . We can then define a generic operation on  $B$  that can be applied to trusts alone ( $T$ ), or to trusts combined with distrusts (typically,  $T - D$ ).

We now give an intuitive description of a single trust propagation step, to be formalized in Section 3.1. Say we already know that  $i$  trusts  $j$ , and we wish to apply the knowledge that  $j$  trusts  $k$ . In one propagation step, we might be able to guess that  $i$  trusts  $k$ . We refer to this operation as an *atomic propagation* since the conclusion is reached based on a single argument, rather than a possibly lengthy chain of arguments. As a more complex example of an atomic propagation, say that once again  $i$  trusts  $j$ . This time, we wish to apply the knowledge that  $k$  trusts both  $j$  and  $\ell$ . Since  $i$  and  $k$  both trust  $j$ , they might share a common worldview; thus, since  $k$  trusts  $\ell$ , perhaps  $i$  should also trust  $\ell$ . We will show how to encode these and other propagations as a single matrix operator. Multiplying a belief matrix by this operator will correspond to applying the single step of propagation.

Next, in Section 3.2, we will describe how to apply a series of  $k$  atomic propagations in sequence. For a positive integer  $k$ , we will refer to  $P^{(k)}$  as the operator for this sequence of  $k$  propagations. Finally, we will describe how to produce our

<sup>1</sup>In our experiments, all entries are drawn from  $\{0, 1\}$ , but our algorithms do not require this.

Name	Meaning
$T$	<i>Trust matrix</i> — $T_{ij}$ is $i$ 's trust of $j$ .
$D$	<i>Distrust matrix</i> — $D_{ij}$ is $i$ 's distrust of $j$ .
$B$	<i>Beliefs</i> — $B$ is generically either $T$ or $T - D$ .
$C_{B,\alpha}$	<i>Combined atomic propagation matrix</i> .
$P^{(k)}$	<i><math>k</math>-step Propagation matrix</i> .
$F$	<i>Final beliefs</i> — $F_{ij}$ is $i$ 's trust of $j$ .

**Table 1: Glossary of all matrix names used throughout the text.**

final set of beliefs  $F$  in terms of these intermediate forms.  $F_{ij}$  will then represent the final trust that  $i$  should hold for  $j$ . As the number of named matrices is somewhat overwhelming, Table 1 gives all the descriptions.

#### 3.1 Atomic propagation


We now formalize the notion of *atomic propagation* described above. Consider a “basis set” of techniques by which the system may infer that one user should trust or distrust another. Each element of the basis set extends a conclusion (such as the conclusion that  $i$  trusts  $j$ ) by a constant-length sequence of forward and backward steps in the graph of expressed trusts. We require that any inference regarding trust should be expressible as a combination of elements of this basis set.<sup>2</sup>

For example, if  $B_{ij} = 1$  indicating that  $i$  trusts  $j$ , and  $B_{jk} = 1$  indicating that  $j$  trusts  $k$ , then an atomic propagation would allow us to infer that  $i$  trusts  $k$ ; we refer to this particular atomic propagation as *direct propagation* since the trust propagates directly along an edge. We will present such propagations as operators that can be applied to the initial belief matrix  $B$  to yield conclusions that can be supported in a single step; we will then chain these operators together. We begin by expressing direct propagation as a matrix  $M$  such that all conclusions expressible by direct propagation can be read from the matrix  $B \cdot M$ . We observe that the appropriate matrix  $M$  to encode direct propagation is simply  $B$  itself: in this case  $B \cdot M = B^2$ , which is the matrix of all length-2 paths in our initial belief graph—for instance, the  $i \rightarrow j \rightarrow k$  path we used in our example in Figure 1. Thus,  $B$  itself is the operator matrix that encodes the direct propagation basis element.

Another candidate basis element described above is *co-citation*. For example, suppose  $i_1$  trusts  $j_1$  and  $j_2$ , and  $i_2$  trusts  $j_2$ . Under co-citation, we would conclude that  $i_2$  should also trust  $j_1$ . The operator  $M$  for this atomic propagation is  $B^T B$ . A little checking will verify that  $B \cdot M$ , which yields  $B B^T B$ , will, in fact, capture all beliefs that are inferable through a single co-citation, as shown in the bottom of Figure 1. The sequence  $B^T B$  can be viewed as a backward-forward step propagating  $i_2$ 's trust of  $j_2$  backward to  $i_1$ , then forward to  $j_1$ .

We also consider *transpose trust*, in which  $i$ 's trust of  $j$  causes  $j$  to develop some level of trust towards  $i$ . And finally,

<sup>2</sup>Generally, the basis elements may be any family of matrix operations using  $B$ . We restrict ourselves to sequences of forward and backward steps following non-zero entries of  $B$  since these capture a general and natural set of propagations.



**Figure 1: Example of basis elements: Direct propagation and co-citation. The dotted lines indicate trust propagation.**

*trust coupling*, in which  $i$ 's trust of  $j$  propagates to  $k$  because  $j$  and  $k$  trust people in common. These atomic propagations are summarized in Table 2.

Atomic Propagation	Operator	Description
Direct propagation	$B$	See top of Figure 1.
Co-citation	$B^T B$	See bottom of Figure 1.
Transpose trust	$B^T$	If $a$ trusts $b$ then trusting $b$ should imply trusting $a$ .
Trust coupling	$BB^T$	$a, b$ trust $c$ , so trusting $a$ should imply trusting $b$ .

**Table 2: Atomic propagations.**

Let  $\alpha = (\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3, \alpha_4)$  be a vector representing weights for combining our four atomic propagation schemes. Then we can capture all the atomic propagations into a single combined matrix  $C_{B,\alpha}$  based on a belief matrix  $B$  and a weight vector  $\alpha$  as follows:

$$C_{B,\alpha} = \alpha_1 B + \alpha_2 B^T B + \alpha_3 B^T + \alpha_4 BB^T.$$

We now explore how those atomic propagations may be chained together.

## 3.2 Propagation of trust and distrust

Our end goal is to produce a final matrix  $F$  from which we can read off the computed trust or distrust of any two users. In the remainder of this section, we first propose two techniques for computing  $F$  from  $C_{B,\alpha}$ . Next, we complete the specification of how the original trust  $T$  and distrust  $D$  matrices can be combined to give  $B$ . We then describe some details of how the iteration itself is performed to capture two distinct views of how distrust should propagate. Finally, we describe some alternatives regarding how the final results should be interpreted.

### 3.2.1 Propagation of distrust

As described above, let  $C_{B,\alpha}$  be a matrix whose  $ij$ -th entry describes how beliefs should flow from  $i$  to  $j$  via an atomic propagation step; if the entry is 0, then nothing can be concluded in an atomic step about  $i$ 's views on  $j$ . Let  $k$

be a positive integer and let  $P^{(k)}$  be a matrix whose  $ij$ -th entry represents the propagation from  $i$  to  $j$  after  $k$  atomic propagations. In other words, beginning with a belief matrix  $B$ , we will arrive at a new belief matrix after  $k$  steps. Thus, the repeated propagation of trust is expressed as a matrix powering operation.

We give three models to define  $B$  (the belief matrix) and  $P^{(k)}$  for the propagation of trust and distrust, given initial trust and distrust matrices  $T$  and  $D$  respectively:

(1) TRUST ONLY: In this case, we ignore distrust completely, and simply propagate trust scores. The defining matrices then become

$$B = T, \quad P^{(k)} = C_{B,\alpha}^k.$$

(2) ONE-STEP DISTRUST: Assume that when a user distrusts somebody, they also discount all judgments made by that person; thus, distrust propagates only a single step, while trust may propagate repeatedly. In this case, we have

$$B = T, \quad P^{(k)} = C_{B,\alpha}^k \cdot (T - D).$$

(3) PROPAGATED DISTRUST: Assume that trust and distrust both propagate together, and that they can be treated as two ends of a continuum. In this case, we take

$$B = T - D, \quad P^{(k)} = C_{B,\alpha}^k.$$

### 3.2.2 Iterative propagation

We can now compute new beliefs based on  $k$  steps of atomic propagations. We now wish to define  $F$ , the final matrix representing the conclusions any user should draw about any other user. But the matrix  $P^{(k)}$  for smaller values of  $k$  may be more reliable, since there have been fewer propagation steps; while larger values of  $k$  may bring in more outside information. We consider two natural approaches to inferring final trust scores from our sequences of propagations.

(1) EIGENVALUE PROPAGATION (EIG): Let  $K$  be a suitably chosen (discussed later) integer. Then, in this model, the final matrix  $F$  is given by

$$F = P^{(K)}.$$

(2) WEIGHTED LINEAR COMBINATIONS (WLC): Let  $\gamma$  be a constant (that is smaller than the largest eigenvalue of  $C_{B,\alpha}$ ) and let  $K$  be a suitably chosen integer. ( $\gamma$  is a discount factor to penalize lengthy propagation steps.) Under this model,  $F$  is given by

$$F = \sum_{k=1}^K \gamma^k \cdot P^{(k)}.$$

### 3.2.3 Rounding

Finally, the result values of  $F$  must be interpreted as either trust or distrust. While continuous-valued (rather than discrete-valued) trusts are mathematically clean [21], we work on the assumption that from the standpoint of usability most real-world systems will in fact use discrete values at which one user can rate another. While our mathematical development (like previous work) has been in the continuous domain, we now consider the ‘‘rounding’’ problem of converting continuous belief values from an arbitrary range into discrete ones (such as  $\pm 1$ ). This corresponds to

+ + + - - + + + + ? + + - + - - - - - - -  
j

**Figure 2: Prediction of  $j$  based on the majority of labels of neighbors of  $i$  (+ means trust and - means distrust) sorted by the trust scores. Here, the prediction would be +.**

applications that demand a Boolean yes/no judgment to the question “Should  $i$  trust  $j$ ?” (Such Boolean rounding is also necessary for our cross-validation experiments in Section 5.) This is tantamount to rounding the entries in matrix  $F$  to either trust or distrust. We discuss three ways this rounding can be accomplished.

(1) GLOBAL ROUNDING: This rounding tries to align the ratio of trust to distrust values in  $F$  to that in the input  $M$ . Consider the row vector  $F_i$ . We judge that  $i$  trusts  $j$  if and only if  $F_{ij}$  is within the top  $\tau$  fraction of entries of the vector  $F_i$ , under the standard  $<$  ordering. The threshold  $\tau$  is chosen based on the overall relative fractions of trust and distrust in the (sparse) input.

(2) LOCAL ROUNDING: Here, we take into account the trust/distrust behavior of  $i$ . As before, we judge that  $i$  trusts  $j$  if and only if  $F_{ij}$  is within the top  $\tau$  fraction of entries of the vector  $F_i$ , under the standard  $<$  ordering. The threshold  $\tau$  is chosen based on the relative fraction of trust vs. distrust judgments made by  $i$ .

(3) MAJORITY ROUNDING: The motivation behind this rounding is to capture the local structure of the original trust and distrust matrix. Consider the set  $J$  of users on whom  $i$  has expressed either trust or distrust. Think of  $J$  as a set of labeled examples using which we are to predict the label of a user  $j, j \notin J$ . We order  $J$  along with  $j$  according to the entries  $F_{ij'}$ , where  $j' \in J \cup \{j\}$ . At the end of this, we have an ordered sequence of trust and distrust labels with the unknown label for  $j$  embedded in the sequence at a unique location (see Figure 2). We now predict label of  $j$  to be that of the majority of the labels in the smallest local neighborhood surrounding it where the majority is well-defined.

More sophisticated notions of rounding are possible. Notice above that local rounding and majority rounding are “ $i$ -centric”. A  $j$ -centric definition is possible in a similar manner. Also note that our notion of majority rounding tries to exploit clustering properties. It is possible to derive improved rounding algorithms by using better one-dimensional clustering algorithms.

Our results show that the rounding algorithm is of significant importance in the predictiveness of the system.

### 3.3 On the transitivity of distrust

It seems clear that if  $i$  trusts  $j$ , and  $j$  trusts  $k$ , then  $i$  should have a somewhat more positive view of  $k$  based on this knowledge. In the realm of distrust, however, this transitivity might not hold. Assume  $i$  distrusts  $j$ , who distrusts  $k$ . Perhaps  $i$  is expressing the view that  $j$ ’s entire value model is so misaligned with  $i$ ’s that anyone  $j$  distrusts is more likely to be trusted by  $i$  (“the enemy of your enemy is your friend”). Alternately, however, perhaps  $i$  has concluded that  $j$ ’s judgments are simply inferior to  $i$ ’s own, and  $j$  has concluded the same about  $k$ —in this case,  $i$  should strongly

distrust  $k$  (“don’t respect someone not respected by someone you don’t respect”). We call the former notion *multiplicative* and the latter *additive* distrust propagation.

Multiplicative trust propagation has some unexpected side-effects: a directed cycle around which the trust/distrust values have a negative product imply that iterated propagation will lead a user to distrust himself! Moreover, such iterated propagation will over time generate a final belief that negates and overwhelms the user’s explicitly expressed belief. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore multiplicative trust propagation because it has some philosophical defensibility.

This problem results because trust and distrust are complex measures representing people’s multi-dimensional utility functions, and we seek here to represent them as a single value. Rather than propose that one answer is more likely to be correct, one can define two corresponding algebraic notions of distrust propagation that may be appropriate for different applications. Notice that by virtue of matrix multiplication, all our earlier definitions implement the multiplicative notion, if we use the trust/distrust values *per se*.

One way to implement the additive distrust notion in our framework is by transforming the matrix  $M$  to  $M'$  before applying the iteration, as follows:

$$m'_{ij} = \begin{cases} \exp(m_{ij}) & m_{ij} \neq 0, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

## 4. EXPERIMENTAL DATA

We begin with a discussion of Epinions, the provider of our data, and we cover the problems that motivated them to develop and maintain a web of trust between individuals. We then dig into the structure of the graph itself.

### 4.1 Data source: Epinions

Epinions is a website where users can write reviews about a variety of topics, ranging from consumer durables (such as cars and toasters) to media objects (such as music and movies) to colleges to vacation spots. Users may author reviews, rate the reviews of other authors, and most importantly for our purposes, may indicate trust or distrust for another user. Amazon ([amazon.com](http://amazon.com)), Slashdot ([slashdot.org](http://slashdot.org)), and some other websites have similar concepts, though they use different terminologies. Trust information performs two key functions. First, many users visit a product category rather than a specific product, and must be shown certain items from the category; trust information is employed to select appropriate items. Second, once a particular product is to be shown, some reviews must also be selected. Most objects accumulate more reviews than any user can read, and there is a wide variation in the quality of reviews. Trust information is used to provide a user-specific selection of particular reviews, based on the trust relationship between the user and the raters and authors of the various reviews.

Reviewers at Epinions are paid royalties based on how many times their reviews are read. This results in many efforts to “game” the system. Distrust was introduced about six months after the initial launch, in part to deal with this problem.

The resulting web of trust is an important and successful mechanism in the popularity of the site, and the high quality of reviews that are selected. Our experiments are performed on this data, which we now describe in more detail.




Figure 3: Degree distributions in the trust graph.

## 4.2 Trust graph characteristics

The Epinions web of trust may be viewed as a directed graph; the data we obtained consists of 131,829 nodes and 841,372 edges, each labeled either trust or distrust. Of these labeled edges, 85.29% are labeled trust; we interpret trust to be the real value  $+1.0$  and distrust to be  $-1.0$ .

We compute the indegree and outdegree distributions of this directed graph, treating both the trust and distrust edges alike (Figure 3). As in the case of many other statistics on the web, these distributions suggest a power law of exponent  $-1.7$ . Interestingly, this is quite different from that of various power laws that have been observed on the web, where the exponent is generally below  $-2.0$ .

The graph also possesses a large strongly connected component (SCC) with 41,441 nodes; the second largest SCC has just 15 nodes. The number of nodes not in the SCC but pointing to it is 39,888 and the number of nodes not in the SCC, but pointed to by it is 30,823. In other words, the trust graph has a roughly symmetric bow tie structure [7], which shows that the trust graph is well connected even if we use the direction of the edges. If we were to treat the edges as undirected, then we have a giant connected component with 119,130 nodes. We also note that the distributions and overall connectivity properties of the graph are largely

preserved even if we restrict our attention to the subgraph induced by the trust edges only.

## 5. EXPERIMENTS

We now describe our experiments and their results. Based on the algorithmic framework developed in Section 3, our algorithms have the following parameters:

1. Propagation of Distrust (3 cases): Trust only, One-step Distrust, or Propagated Distrust.
2. Iteration Method (3 cases): EIG iteration, WLC iteration,  $\gamma = 0.5$ , and WLC iteration,  $\gamma = 0.9$ .
3. Rounding (3 cases): Global, Local, or Majority.
4. Atomic Propagations (3 cases): Direct only ( $\alpha = e_1$ ), Co-citation only ( $\alpha = e_2$ ), or Combined ( $\alpha = (0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1)$ ).

These dimensions result in  $3^4 = 81$  experimental schemes.

We seek to determine whether any particular algorithm can correctly induce the trust or distrust that  $i$  holds for  $j$ . Our cross-validation method is the following. Given the trust graph described above, we mask a single *trial* edge  $(i, j)$  from the graph, and then ask each of the 81 schemes to guess whether  $i$  trusts<sup>3</sup>  $j$ . Note that even through the matrices  $T$  and  $D$  are sparse, the final matrix  $F$  is not. Considering the dimensions of the matrices involved, it is not feasible to do (in-memory) matrix-matrix multiplications to obtain a matrix of trust scores for every pair of nodes. Instead, we perform a Lanczos-style matrix operation in which, at each step, we do only matrix-vector multiplications. At the end of the matrix-vector multiplications, we obtain a vector that contains the trust score of  $i$  for all users. Since all our rounding methods use only this vector, we never need the entire final matrix  $F$ .

We perform this trial on 3,250 randomly masked edges for each of 81 schemes, resulting in 263K total trust computations, and tabulate the results in Table 3. In this table,  $\epsilon$  denotes the prediction error of an algorithm and a given rounding method, i.e.,  $\epsilon$  is the fraction of incorrect predictions made by the algorithm.

As noted earlier, trust edges in the graph outnumber the distrust edges by a huge margin: 85 versus 15. Hence, a naive algorithm that always predicts “trust” will incur a prediction error of only 15%. We nevertheless first report our results for prediction on randomly masked edges in the graph, as it reflects the underlying problem. However, to ensure that our algorithms are not benefiting unduly from this bias, we also take the largest balanced subset of the 3,250 randomly masked trial edges such that half the edges are trust and the other half are distrust—this is done by taking all the 498 distrust edges in the trial set as well as 498 randomly chosen trust edges from the trial set. Thus, the size of this subset  $S$  is 996. We measure the prediction error in  $S$  and call it  $\epsilon_S$ . Note that the naive prediction error on  $S$  would be 50%. Table 3 shows both values for each experimental category.

<sup>3</sup>We insist that  $i$  make a Boolean decision about  $j$ . This is so that we can measure the efficacy of our algorithms against real data and does not reflect an inadequacy of our algorithm. In fact, as we mentioned earlier, our algorithms operate in the continuous domain and rounding to trust or distrust is the (non-trivial) final step.

Iteration	$\alpha$	Propagation	Global round.		Local round.		Maj. round.	
			$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$	$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$	$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$
EIG	$e_1$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.123	0.399	0.077	0.175
		One-step distrust	0.119	0.251	0.108	0.223	0.067	0.162
		Prop. distrust	0.365	0.452	0.368	0.430	0.084	0.206
	$e_2$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.114	0.365	0.080	0.190
		One-step distrust	0.097	0.259	0.087	0.234	0.066	0.159
		Prop. distrust	0.149	0.380	0.121	0.279	0.080	0.187
	$e^*$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.107	0.336	0.077	0.180
		One-step distrust	0.096	0.253	0.086	0.220	0.064	0.147
		Prop. distrust	0.110	0.284	0.101	0.238	0.079	0.180
WLC, $\gamma = 0.5$	$e_1$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.123	0.390	0.189	0.163
		One-step distrust	0.093	0.231	0.083	0.205	0.098	0.205
		Prop. distrust	0.102	0.221	0.098	0.199	0.121	0.295
	$e_2$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.113	0.354	0.074	0.174
		One-step distrust	0.088	0.254	0.080	0.231	0.093	0.187
		Prop. distrust	0.126	0.336	0.100	0.252	0.076	0.177
	$e^*$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.108	0.340	0.078	0.159
		One-step distrust	0.086	0.247	0.076	0.217	0.092	0.190
		Prop. distrust	0.087	0.237	0.079	0.203	0.074	0.162
WLC, $\gamma = 0.9$	$e_1$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.123	0.391	0.132	0.152
		One-step distrust	0.102	0.241	0.092	0.216	0.069	0.171
		Prop. distrust	0.111	0.238	0.106	0.211	0.101	0.227
	$e_2$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.113	0.356	0.078	0.184
		One-step distrust	0.092	0.260	0.082	0.235	0.071	0.173
		Prop. distrust	0.134	0.355	0.106	0.261	0.078	0.188
	$e^*$	Trust only	0.153	0.500	0.107	0.337	0.075	0.169
		One-step distrust	0.091	0.253	0.082	0.222	0.072	0.171
		Prop. distrust	0.091	0.254	0.081	0.209	0.078	0.177

**Table 3: Prediction of various algorithms. Here,  $e^* = (0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1)$ ,  $K = 20$ .**

## 5.1 Results


From Table 3, we see that we achieve prediction errors as low as 6.4% on the entire set of 3250 trials and errors as low as 14.7% on the subset  $S$ . The best performance is achieved for the one-step distrust propagation scheme with EIG iteration and  $\alpha = (0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1)$ .

### 5.1.1 Basis elements

It was our expectation in undertaking these experiments that direct propagation would be the method of choice, and that the other basis elements would provide limited value. However, the value of co-citation has been proven for web pages by the success of the HITS algorithm [15], so we included it and the other basis elements. The results, shown in Figure 4, were quite surprising: propagation based only on co-citation alone (basis vector  $\alpha = e_2$  in the figure) performed quite well. Notice that in this model, simple edge transitivity in the underlying trust graph does not apply: just because  $i$  trusts  $j$  and  $j$  trusts  $k$ , we can conclude nothing about  $i$ 's view of  $k$ . So it is quite surprising that this method performs well. Over all cases in our large table,  $e^*$  is the best overall performer. This suggests that there is a certain resilience to variations in the data by adopting many different mechanisms to infer trust relationships. We recommend this scheme in environments where it is affordable.

### 5.1.2 Incorporation of distrust

One-step distrust propagation is the best performer with the EIG type of iteration for each of the nine cases (three



**Figure 4: Results for different values of  $\alpha$ , majority rounding, against result score  $\epsilon_S$ .**




Figure 5: Results for the WLC iteration,  $\gamma \in \{0.5, 0.9\}$ , showing iteration methods and basis vectors against result score  $\epsilon_S$ .

rounding methods and three basis vectors  $\alpha$ ). We can consistently recommend one-step distrust in this case. With the WLC type of iteration, distrust is clearly helpful, but depending on the basis vector  $\alpha$ , either one-step or propagated distrust may perform better, as shown in Figure 5. The  $\gamma = 0.9$  case, which favors long paths, performs worse for one-step distrust than the  $\gamma = 0.5$  case. For other distrust models, though, the results are mixed. The most striking result of Figure 5 is that direct propagation (the  $e_1$  case) is the only situation in which distrust actually hurts, sometimes quite substantially;<sup>4</sup> in all other cases we recommend using one-step distrust as robust, effective, and easy to compute. Direct propagation ( $\alpha = e_1$ ) in tree-structured networks that have no self-loops and no short cycles may result in local information having little impact on the trust scores, which could be undesirable. Recall that the EIG iteration does not introduce any “restart” probability; this would be easy to add, and would result in an algorithm more similar to the WLC iteration.

### 5.1.3 Rounding

The results for rounding are broken out in Figure 6. The figure compares rounding algorithms for the best setting for the EIG iteration (one-step distrust with  $\alpha = e^*$ ) and the best setting for the WLC iteration (propagated distrust,  $\gamma = 0.5, \alpha = e^*$ ). In all cases, majority clustering beats local rounding, which in turn beats global rounding. To our surprise, this part of the algorithm turned out to be quite critical both in getting good results, and in providing strong performance across all the different cases. We recommend using a decision method like majority rounding.

### 5.1.4 Iteration models

Figure 7 restricts attention to the generally best basis vector ( $\alpha = e^*$ ) and the best rounding method (majority rounding), and compares results for EIG, and WLC with  $\gamma = \{0.5, 0.9\}$ . The best results are attained with EIG with one-step distrust.

<sup>4</sup>See Section 3.3 for a discussion of the difficult issues that arise in direct propagation of distrust.




Figure 6: Results for rounding using the best overall settings for the EIG and the WLC iteration against result score  $\epsilon_S$ .




Figure 7: Results for all iteration methods with  $\alpha = e^*$ , majority rounding, against result score  $\epsilon_S$ .



Iter.	Trust only $\alpha = e_1$		One-step distrust $\alpha = e^*$		Prop. distrust $\alpha = e^*$	
	$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$	$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$	$\epsilon$	$\epsilon_S$
1	0.120	0.300	0.096	0.209	0.080	0.209
2	0.189	0.216	0.086	0.197	0.082	0.191
3	0.177	0.184	0.088	0.203	0.074	0.184
4	0.157	0.153	0.091	0.206	0.084	0.188
5	0.150	0.156	0.086	0.200	0.082	0.197
6	0.141	0.153	0.086	0.203	0.080	0.197
7	0.135	0.156	0.082	0.197	0.081	0.194

**Table 4: Effect of number of iterations on  $\epsilon$  and  $\epsilon_S$  for cluster rounding. The iteration type is EIG with  $\gamma = 0.9$  and the number of samples is 1000.**

### 5.1.5 The effect of the number of iterations, $K$

The following table (Table 4) shows the effect of the number of iterations for three selected settings of parameters. For trust only propagation with  $\alpha = e_1$ , meaning only direct propagation allowed, increasing the number of iterations has a more dramatic effect on improving the prediction error than for other propagation methods. This is as expected as direct propagation occurs along the directed edges of the graph. In contrast, the other propagation methods, assisted by  $\alpha = e^* = (0.4, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1)$ , do not enjoy similar dramatic improvements with increasing the number of iterations. In part, this is because the shortest path between most test pairs has length two, so longer iterations may fail to help.

## 6. CONCLUSIONS

Over the last few years, a number of e-commerce related sites have made a trust network one of their cornerstones. Propagation of trust is a fundamental problem that needs to be solved in the context of such systems. In this paper, we develop a formal framework of trust propagation schemes, introducing the formal and computational treatment of distrust propagation. We also develop a treatment of “rounding” computed continuous-valued trusts to derive the discrete values more common in applications. Each of our methods may be appropriate in certain circumstances; we evaluate the schemes on a large, real world, working trust network from the Epinions web site. We show that a small number of expressed trusts per individual allows the system to predict trust between any two people in the system with high accuracy. We show how distrust, rounding and other such phenomenon have significant effects on how trust is propagated.

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