Software and Network Security

Furkan Alaca furkan.alaca@carleton.ca

Carleton University


SYSC 4700, Winter 2018

Software Vulnerabilities

- ► Software vulnerabilities are often caused by programming errors, e.g., failure to **validate program input**
 - May be locally or remotely exploitable
- Vulnerabilities may also arise due to
 - ► Flaws in protocol design (e.g., KRACK)
 - ► Hardware flaws (e.g., Meltdown and Spectre)
- ► Software security is closely related to software quality and reliability. Primary difference is as follows:
 - Quality and reliability are concerned with accidental software failure due to some legitimate real-world input or program interaction that was unanticipated by the programmer or not adequately tested for.
 - Software security is concerned with ensuring that programs continue to function correctly even while under attack, either by executing safely or by failing gracefully. Requires defensive programming.
- When vulnerabilities are identified, they are typically patched

Buffer Overflow Introduction

 Programming error in which oversized input data is written to a fixed-size buffer and consequently overwrites adjacent memory



- ► Occurs in low-level languages (e.g., C/C++) that provide direct access to memory addresses (e.g., through pointers)
- Possible consequences:
 - Program crash
 - Data corruption (e.g., local variables)
 - ▶ Transfer control of the program to the attacker

Buffer Overflow Demo

Live demo exercise from:

https://exploit-exercises.com/protostar/

Infamous Buffer Overflow Incidents

- ▶ Morris worm of 1988: Infected and crippled 6,000 computers worldwide (about 10% of computers connected to the Internet)
- ▶ Blaster worm of 2003: Infected around 16 million computers
 - Implicated in Northeast blackout of 2003
 - Affected many other businesses, e.g., took down Air Canada check-in system



(a) Morris worm source code, Computer History Museum, Mountain View, CA



(b) Northeast power outage

Software Vulnerabilities: Summary of Defenses

- Always stay up-to-date with latest security patches
- ▶ Defensive programming (e.g., input sanitization, use of "safe" library functions)
- Follow well-established security design principles, e.g., (non-exhaustive list)
 - Use secure defaults
 - Open design (do not rely on "security by obscurity")
 - Principle of least privilege
 - Defense in depth
 - Minimize attack surface (more on this in upcoming slides!)
 - ▶ More in the 1975 paper by Saltzer & Schroeder: *The Protection of Information in Computer Systems*

Reducing Network Attack Surface


- ▶ Hosts on your network may be hosting network services which:
 - Don't follow stringent security practices
 - May be out-of-date, and therefore contain software vulnerabilities
- ► **Firewalls** can regulate access to your network in accordance with a security policy
 - Can filter all traffic based on source and destination IP address and TCP/UDP port
 - Most secure practice is to disallow all traffic by default, and make exceptions for the services which you would like to provide
- Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) can monitor network activity and detect:
 - Anomaly detection can detect traffic which deviates from normal patterns
 - ► Signature detection can detect traffic associated with known attacks
 - ► Honeypots can be used to observe attacker behaviour and improve firewall policies

Protecting Network Services

- Secure tunneling (e.g., ssh tunnelling) can be used to establish an encrypted connection between two hosts to access network services that are blocked by the firewall
- ▶ Reduced attack surface by keeping applications blocked on the firewall (i.e., disallow access from outside the network), and only allowing access to a single port through which authorized users can authenticate (e.g., via a password or public key) and establish a secure tunnel through which they can access any other applications (e.g., web server, network storage) running on the host



Virtual Private Networks



- ▶ A Virtual Private Network (VPN) consists of a set of LANs and remote hosts which are connected securely over a public network
 - Virtual: Uses existing infrastructure
 - ▶ Private: Data is encapsulated through a secure (encrypted) protocol
 - ▶ Network: The LANs and remote hosts can operate as one network
- ► Reduces attack surface by eliminating the need to make network services accessible through the public Internet
 - ▶ VPN users from remote locations can access services the same way as they would if they were physically present on the same LAN

Concluding Summary

- ► We learned the basics of why software vulnerabilities occur, how they are exploited, how to protect against them
- Network-level techniques for reducing attack surface
- Security design principles: These apply to all kinds of systems, e.g., computer networks, operating systems, web browsers
- ▶ Defense is more difficult than offense: The defender needs to defend against all possible attacks, but the attacker only needs to develop a single successful attack to gain a foothold on your system or network

Figures credit

▶ Figure from slide 10 taken from Computer Security Principles and Practice 3e by Stallings & Brown (2014)

Extra Slides

Software Vulnerability Case Study: OpenSSL Heartbleed

- ► Root cause of the 2014 OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability: Failure to validate input
- ► The TLS Heartbeat protocol sends a periodic message to indicate that the host is still alive during long idle periods
 - Client sends heartbeat_request message which includes payload length, payload, and padding fields
 - Server receives the request, allocates a buffer large enough to hold the message header, payload, and padding
 - Server saves the incoming message into the buffer, and transmits a response message which includes the payload length and payload fields
 - ► What happens if client sends a heartbeat_request with a payload length of 64KB but only includes a 16-byte payload?

- ▶ Denial of Service (DoS) is a form of attack on the availability of some service (typically a network service)
- ► Can target network- , transport-, or application-layer resources
- DoS attacks may originate from:
 - A single system under the attacker's control
 - ▶ A large group of compromised hosts (e.g., botnets)
 - ► Traffic that the attacker "reflects" off of remote hosts
- Reflected DoS attacks are enabled by:
 - The ability to spoof the source IP address
 - ISPs should perform egress filtering to filter IP addresses that do not originate from their network
 - Network services on legitimate hosts which respond to any requests
 - e.g., a DNS request (~60 bytes) can result in a massive 4000-byte response
 - Networks which accept directed broadcast packets
 - Organizations should perform ingress filtering to filter such packets

Layer 3: Network bandwidth

- ▶ If there is more traffic destined to the organization's network than its link can carry, routers on the path will buffer and subsequently drop packets
- Hardest type of DoS attack to handle: Need to co-operate with upstream ISPs to install filtering rules on routers




Figure 7.1 Example Network to Illustrate DoS Attacks

Layer 4: System resources

- ► Aims to overload network handling software by targeting resources such as incoming packet buffers or tables of open connections
- ► Classic example: **SYN spoofing** overflows a server's TCP connection table to obstruct subsequent incoming connections
- ▶ Recall the TCP three-way handshake:
 - Client initiates the request for a TCP connection by sending a SYN packet to the server
 - Server records the request details (e.g., client address and port number, initial seq. number) in a table and responds with a SYN-ACK packet
 - Client responds with ACK, connection is established
- ► An attacker could flood the server with SYN packets with forged unused/inactive source addresses which will not reply to the server's SYN-ACK (typically with a RST, if the SYN-ACK was unsolicited)
 - ▶ SYN Cookies: Defensive mechanism where the server encodes connection details into initial sequence number in SYN-ACK packet instead of the connection table

Layer 7: Application resources

- ► An attack on a specific application, e.g., a Web server, typically involves sending valid requests, each of which consumes significant resources
- ► Typical example: Flood target with HTTP requests that perform expensive SQL queries
 - Can rate-limit requests and blacklist IP addresses of abusive hosts to prevent overloading
 - Can use Captcha puzzles to help distinguish between legitimate human initiated-traffic and automated bots
- Other attacks may exploit software vulnerabilities, e.g., a buffer overflow or race condition, to cause a server to crash
 - Software should be kept up-to-date with security patches
 - ▶ Application-level firewalls can filter out known attack signatures